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Although confl ict and negotiation studies have examined symmetrical structures in which 
both parties want change, or asymmetrical structures in which one party wants change and the 
other to maintain the status quo, no research provided a direct comparison of both structures. 
Two experiments were conducted to fi ll this void. Results show that in asymmetrical structures 
challengers engage in more problem solving and more contending, have less of a loss frame 
and perceive less control than defendants, and are perceived be less successful. In symmetrical 
structures, behavior and attitudes of parties are more alike and there is more reciprocation of 
problem solving and yielding. Furthermore, fi ndings reveal that challengers see their defendant 
as less friendly and more dominant than defendants see their challengers. Finally, no evidence 
was obtained that social value orientation moderates these effects. Implications for confl ict 
theory and research, and for third party interventions in symmetrical versus asymmetrical 
confl icts, are discussed. 
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wife need to decide where to have dinner or 
how many children to aim for, or when labor 
and management decide about a downsizing 
strategy. 
In his 1986 address to the American Psychological 
Association, Coombs (1987) argued that some 
confl icts arise because opposing individuals want 
the same thing and must settle for different 
things, as when leaders from different teams 
claim the same excess budget, when children 
desire the same toy to play with, or when neigh-
boring states desire hegemony of the same 
group of islands. Other confl icts arise because 
individuals want different things and must 
settle for the same thing, as when husband and 
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Although Coombs notes that these two broad 
classes of confl ict structures ‘exhaust the domain 
of confl ict’ (p. 362), it is important to note that 
in both types of confl ict a further distinction 
can be made, namely between symmetrical and 
asymmetrical structures. We concur with Coombs 
(1987) that ‘individuals, in spite of how they may 
assess their status quo in any absolute terms, are 
motivated to improve on the status quo and to 
avoid worsening it’ (p. 358). However, we argue 
that many confl icts are asymmetrical in that 
one party (defendant) is primarily motivated to 
maintain the status quo whereas its counterpart 
(challenger) is primarily motivated to change 
it. Thus, the Falkland War was about Argentina 
contesting Britain’s ‘colonial’ hegemony over 
the group of islands just off the Argentinean 
coast—Argentina attacked the status quo and 
the United Kingdom defended it. Martin Luther 
King’s dream was about changing the status quo 
that was induced and defended by the White 
majority. Many union-led strikes are motivated 
by the desire to block management’s desire to 
change the status quo in terms of job securities 
and fringe benefi ts, and some marital confl icts 
are not about how many children to aim for, 
but about one spouse desiring children and 
the other wishing to maintain the quiet and 
peaceful (in terms of children-caused noise) 
status quo.
Despite decades of social psychological re-
search into confl ict and dispute resolution, 
little systematic research has been invested in 
comparing symmetrical and asymmetrical struc-
tures.1 This is unfortunate because there is good 
reason to believe that the structure of the confl ict 
in and by itself has important implications for 
the way parties manage their confl ict, perceive 
their counterparts, and thus for the probability 
of the confl ict escalating into intractable disputes. 
However, we do not exactly know the differences 
between symmetrical and asymmetrical confl icts. 
Symmetrical confl icts are primarily examined 
in the (laboratory) context of interpersonal 
negotiations (De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel & Van 
Kleef, 2007; Pruitt, 1998). Asymmetrical confl icts 
are primarily examined in the (fi eld) context of 
marital relations (Christensen & Heavey, 1990; 
Heavey, Layne, & Christensen, 1993; Klinetob & 
Smith, 1996; Kluwer, 1998; Kluwer, Heesink, & 
Van de Vliert, 1996, 1997, 2000), and judicial 
disputes and liability negotiations (Fobian & 
Christensen-Szalanski, 1993, 1994; Garcia, Darley, 
& Robinson, 2001; Peirce, Pruitt, & Czaja, 1993). 
Furthermore, work on asymmetrical confl ict is 
constrained by the fact that a party’s position 
(challenger vs. defender) covaries with other 
relevant variables, including one party’s gender 
(female vs. male, respectively) or occupational 
status (district attorney vs. public defender, 
respectively). It thus is diffi cult to tell whether, 
fi rst of all, systematic differences between sym-
metrical and asymmetrical confl ict exist and, 
second, whether such differences should be 
attributed to the party’s specifi c position in the 
dispute, some covarying variable, or both.
The present study was designed to redress this 
situation, and we present a series of experimental 
studies in which we tested predictions about the 
effect of confl ict structures on confl ict-related 
cognition, interpersonal perception, and con-
fl ict management. Predictions were derived from 
work on gain-loss framing and the endowment 
effect (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1990; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), work on the status 
quo bias (Ritov & Baron, 1992; Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Schweitzer, 1994), and studies 
on power relations and interpersonal perception 
(Fiske, 1993). 
Cognitive, motivational, 
and behavioral consequences 
of different confl ict structures
In symmetrical confl icts each side desires a 
change in the status quo and needs the other 
side to consent or even work along. Most nego-
tiations have such a symmetrical structure—both 
negotiators want something their counterparts 
has, and both negotiators only want to give up 
what they have in exchange for some alternative 
not in their possession. Thus, negotiators ex-
change their used car for money, an increase in 
salary in return for higher production targets, 
arms reduction in return for market accessibility, 
extra work effort in return for better career 
prospects, and so on. In short, both parties 
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give up something in return for something else 
deemed more desirable, or less undesirable.
In asymmetrical confl icts one side desires a 
change in the status quo and needs the other 
side to go along, but this other side desires to 
maintain the status quo. Many judicial disputes 
and liability negotiations have this asymmetrical 
structure, with the district attorney seeking to 
change the not-guilty status quo into a ‘guilty’ 
verdict, and the plaintiff seeking to maintain the 
‘not-guilty’ status quo. In the workplace, asym-
metrical confl icts emerge when management 
wants change resisted by the workforce, or when 
customer complaints require service personnel 
to change their work practices and routines. 
Thus, whereas in symmetrical confl icts both 
parties seek change, in asymmetrical confl icts 
one seeks change and the counterparts does not. 
This symmetrical versus asymmetrical structure 
of the confl ict has several important implications 
that reside at the cognitive, the motivational, 
and the strategic level.
Cognitive and motivational consequences of 
confl ict structures
Work on human decision making has argued 
that those who face a choice between adopting 
a new strategy versus maintaining the status 
quo, as defendants in asymmetrical confl icts 
do, have a strong tendency to prefer the status 
quo to alternative options. This is commonly 
referred to as the Status Quo Bias (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988). 
Schweitzer (1994) provides several reasons 
for the Status Quo Bias, including the notion 
that giving up the status quo may be felt as a loss, 
whereas improving upon the status quo, as chal-
lengers try to do, feels more like establishing a 
gain. Because losses are more averse than gains 
of identical size are attractive (loss aversion; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), people have more 
diffi culty giving up the status quo (incurring a 
loss) than giving up the goal of changing it (not 
acquiring a gain) (cf. Bottom & Studt, 1993; 
De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 
1994; Neale & Bazerman, 1985). Another reason 
for the Status Quo Bias is that people desire to 
have and maintain control over their situation. 
In asymmetrical confl icts defendants control the 
outcome of the confl ict more than challengers 
do (Keltner & Robinson, 1997; Robinson & 
Keltner, 1996). By giving up the status quo de-
fendants give up a highly valued asset, namely 
control (also see Garcia et al., 2001). 
All in all, these tendencies suggest that in 
asymmetrical confl icts defendants more than 
challengers will perceive more control, are 
more likely to adopt a loss-frame, and will be 
relatively stubborn and diffi cult to be persuaded 
to take action. In other words, it seems quite 
reasonable to propose that defendants have a 
greater sense of power than challengers, and as 
such may be more likely to endorse and employ 
power tactics to get their way. In the next section 
we explore such possible consequences for the 
ways parties in symmetrical versus asymmetrical 
confl ict manage their dispute.
Strategic considerations, confl ict 
management, and interaction sequences
Although exceptions can be readily identifi ed, 
most individuals involved in social confl ict are 
strongly concerned with their own outcomes. 
Indeed, high concern for own outcomes 
seems the default in interpersonal negotiation 
(De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), and concern 
for own outcomes tends to have little variance 
across confl ict participants—it is high and stable 
across people ( Janssen & Van de Vliert, 1996). A 
reasonable assumption thus is that participants 
in both symmetrical and asymmetrical confl icts 
desire to reach good outcomes, at least for 
themselves.
To safeguard or promote self-interest, confl ict 
parties resort to a number of tactics and stra-
tegies. Although an infi nite number of confl ict 
tactics and strategies may be conceived of, 
confl ict research and theory tends to converge on 
a four-way taxonomy that distinguishes between 
problem solving, contending, avoiding, and 
yielding (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu, 
Evers, Beersma, Kluwer & Nauta, 2001; Rahim, 
1983; Thomas, 1992; Van de Vliert & Kabanoff, 
1990). Problem solving tactics are oriented toward 
an agreement that satisfi es both own and other’s 
aspirations as much as possible, and involve an 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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exchange of information about priorities and 
preferences, showing insights, and making 
tradeoffs between important and unimportant 
issues. Contending tactics are focused on im-
posing one’s will on the other side, and they 
involve threats and bluffs, persuasive arguments, 
and positional commitments. Yielding tactics are 
oriented toward accepting and incorporating 
other’s will, and involve unilateral concessions, 
unconditional promises, and offering help. 
Avoidance tactics involve reducing the import-
ance of the issues, and attempts to suppress 
thinking about the issues. 
Dispute resolution involves an exchange of 
tactics, and the sequence of exchange typic-
ally takes one of two forms (Olekalns & Smith, 
2000). Interaction sequences can, fi rst of all, 
be reciprocal, in which case negotiators match 
each other’s strategies exactly or in kind. Thus, 
problem solving tactics are reciprocated with 
problem solving or yielding tactics (reciprocal 
cooperation), and contending tactics are reci-
procated with contending tactics (reciprocal 
competition). Second, interaction sequences 
can be transformational, in which negotiators 
mismatch strategies by pairing a cooperative and 
a competitive strategy. For example, problem 
solving tactics are reciprocated with contending 
tactics, and contending tactics are reciprocated 
with avoiding and withdrawal tactics. 
Work on symmetrical confl icts, like inter-
personal negotiation, generally fi nds reciprocal 
tendencies—problem-solving tactics are reci-
procated, as are contending tactics (Weingart, 
Bazerman, Thompson, & Carroll, 1990). Recent 
work further indicates that in symmetrical 
disputes participants start out with contend-
ing tactics, trying to persuade their counter-
parts to give in, and switching to problem solving 
tactics when continued use of contending 
appears to lead to costly impasse rather than 
one-sided victory (Brett, Shapird, & Lytle, 1998; 
Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck, De Dreu, & 
Van Vianen, 2000; Olekalns & Smith, 2005). 
In other words, in symmetrical confl icts where 
power is balanced among parties we expect rela-
tively high levels of contending and problem 
solving among both parties, and no differences 
between parties in the amount of contending 
and problem solving.
Work on asymmetrical confl icts, in which de-
fendants may perceive themselves to be relatively 
more powerful, generally fi nds transformational 
tendencies—problem solving and yielding tactics 
are paired to contending tactics, or to avoiding 
and withdrawal responses (and vice versa). For 
example, both survey and observation studies 
of marital interaction where husband and 
wife discuss the wife’s desire to change and the 
husband’s desire to maintain the status quo reveal 
a so-called demand–withdrawal pattern in which 
the wife demands change (through problem 
solving or through contending tactics) and 
the husband withdraws from the interaction 
(e.g. Christensen & Heavey, 1990; Heavey et al., 
1993; Kluwer, 1998). In other words, in asym-
metrical confl icts we expect among challengers 
higher levels of contending and problem solv-
ing tactics than among defendants, who in turn 
display relatively high levels of avoiding tactics. 
This is quite consistent with work on the Status 
Quo Bias reviewed earlier—defendants were 
expected to experience more control, to be more 
likely to adopt a loss-frame, and to be relatively 
stubborn. These conflict-related cognitions 
undermine their tendency to reciprocate in kind 
their challengers’ attempts at problem solving 
or at contending.2 
Hypotheses and overview of the 
present experiments
Past work either focused on symmetrical or on 
asymmetrical confl ict structures, and we are 
unaware of studies that directly compared the 
two structures in one single study design. Our 
goal was to fi ll this void, and to test several pre-
dictions about confl ict management strategies 
and outcomes. Based on the above analysis 
and on results from past studies, we tested the 
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Challengers in asymmetrical con-
fl icts employ more problem-solving tactics than 
their defendants; in symmetrical conflicts no 
differences in problem solving between challengers 
are expected.
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Hypothesis 2 : Challengers in asymmetrical con-
fl icts employ more contending tactics than their 
defendants; in symmetrical confl icts no differences 
in contending between challengers are expected.
Hypothesis 3: Challengers in asymmetrical confl icts 
employ fewer avoiding tactics than their defendants; 
in symmetrical confl icts no differences in avoiding 
between challengers are expected.
Hypothesis 4: Challengers in asymmetrical confl icts 
will feel less successful than their defendants; in 
symmetrical confl icts no differences in felt success 
between challengers are expected.
We tested these four hypotheses in two ex-
perimental studies in which participants engaged 
in free face-to-face interaction to solve a dispute. 
In both experiments we manipulated confl ict 
structure through role instructions. In Experi-
ment 1 we audiotaped the interaction process 
and coded confl ict behavior. In Experiment 2 
we relied on retrospective self-ratings of confl ict 
behavior using a validated instrument. In add-
ition, Experiment 2 assessed motivation and 
cognition through questionnaire measures, 
and addressed the moderating infl uence of 
individual differences in the inclination to 
cooperate or compete with one’s counterpart. 
These issues will be introduced in more detail 
after Experiment 1 has been reported.
Before moving on, it is important to note 
that in contrast to many studies on confl ict and 
negotiation we did not use a confl ict task that led 
to scorable outcomes. This was done for two 
reasons. First, point-value tasks used in most bar-
gaining and negotiation research often allows 
participants to closely monitor who is getting 
what, and we felt this interferes with proper 
testing of some of our predictions regarding 
confl ict cognition (e.g. about loss-frame; see 
Experiment 2). Second, while ‘objective’ out-
comes are certainly relevant, long-term effects 
of confl ict relate more to perceived success and 
failure, and the ‘softer’ psychological outcomes 
such as hurt relationships and feelings of anger 
and spite (De Dreu et al., 2007). Thus, we 
decided to test our hypotheses regarding out-
comes in terms of perceived success, rather than 
objective, economic outcomes. 
Experiment 1
Method
Design To test the hypotheses, the experiment 
employed a role-playing methodology that was 
developed in a pilot experiment and was based 
on our past research (e.g. De Dreu, Nauta, & 
Van de Vliert, 1995, Experiment 3). Participants 
were provided with background information in 
which a confl ict situation was described, and 
then freely interacted with each other to discuss 
the issue. This interaction was audio taped and 
rated afterwards by four judges. 
The confl ict situation yielded a challenger who 
wanted to change the status quo coupled with 
either another challenger (symmetrical con-
fl ict condition) or a defendant who wanted to 
maintain the status quo (asymmetrical confl ict 
condition). The design was 2 × 2 factorial 
involving Confl ict Structure (Symmetrical vs. 
Asymmetrical) and Role (Party A, challenger 
vs. Party B, challenger/defendant) with Confl ict 
Structure manipulated between dyads and Role 
manipulated within dyads. Dependent variables 
were confl ict behavior and outcomes.
Participants and procedure Seventy-eight 
psychology students (30 males and 46 females: 
2 did not indicate their gender) at the University 
of Groningen participated in return for the 
equivalent of US $5. They were randomly assigned 
to dyads. The mean age of the participants was 
22 years, ranging from 19 to 26 years. Initial 
analyses revealed no differences between male 
and female participants, nor between dyads 
composed of same or different gender.
Participants came to the laboratory in groups 
of four and care was taken that participants in 
one session were unacquainted. Participants 
were seated and given 10 minutes to read their 
role instructions (see below). Hereafter, par-
ticipants were paired and seated in separate 
rooms where they engaged in an audiotaped 
confl ict resolution process (see below). After 15 
minutes, the experimenter entered the room 
and handed out a short questionnaire used to 
assess confl ict outcomes. Hereafter, participants 
were debriefed and dismissed.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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Confl ict task The instructions described a 
situation in which the participant cooperates 
with a fellow student on a research project.3 
The original schedule of activities for the next 
week was that the students do statistical an-
alyses together. In both the symmetrical and the 
asymmetrical condition, Party A (challenger) 
is told that s/he will start a full-time job and 
therefore wants to change the schedule so that 
the other student does the statistical analyses 
alone. Party A further received some background 
information supporting the idea that changing 
the original schedule was justifi ed and that, all in 
all, s/he has reason to be quite dissatisfi ed with 
the way things were going. In the symmetrical 
condition, participants in the role of Party B 
(challenger) read similar instructions: Party B 
wanted to change the schedule so that the 
other student does the statistical analyses alone, 
because (s)he will have an oral exam at the end 
of the week. Arguments were given why Party B 
felt that changing the original schedule was 
justifi ed and that s/he has reason to be quite 
dissatisfi ed with the way things were going. In 
the asymmetrical condition, Party B (defendant) 
wanted to maintain the original schedule for 
that week—s/he wanted to do the statistical 
analyses together with Party A. Arguments were 
given why s/he wanted to maintain the original 
schedule and that s/he felt quite satisfi ed with 
the with the way things were going. 
After reading the instructions, participants 
were told that they had 15 minutes to discuss 
their preferences and to reach agreement on 
their schedule of activities.
Dependent variables 
Confl ict management The negotiations were 
audiotaped and coded by four trained observers 
unaware of the goals of the experiment. During 
training, observers were provided with de-
finitions of conflict management strategies 
along with prototypical examples of behaviors 
within a particular strategy. They also coded, 
in practice sessions, randomly selected time 
intervals and discussed their observations and 
ratings to establish a consensual perspective. 
Hereafter, observers independently rated the 
confl ict behaviors of each of the two parties 
within a dyad. Using electronic beeps, the 39 
audiotaped conversations were divided into time 
samples of two minutes (N = 212 time samples, 
M = 5.4 time samples per dyad). For every 
two-minute interval, two observers rated the 
extent to which four confl ict tactics (problem 
solving, contending, yielding, and avoiding; 
1 = demonstrated not at all, to 4 = demonstrated to 
a great extent) were present for Party A and the 
other two observers did so for Party B. Inter-
observer agreement was sufficient to good, 
with Cohen’s Kappas per time-interval varying 
between .67 and .98 (average Kappas for Party A 
and Party B were .75 and .81, respectively). 
An alternative assessment using correlational 
analysis likewise indicated suffi cient to good 
inter-rater agreement (.56 < r < .85). To account 
for mean differences between observer dyads 
original ratings of all four confl ict behaviors were 
transformed to z scores, using the means and 
standard deviations computed per observer 
dyad, across all 212 time samples.4 
Perceived success Participants were given a brief 
questionnaire to fi ll out immediately follow-
ing the confl ict resolution process, to indicate 
(1) whether they got what they wanted (1 = not 
at all, to 7 = completely), and (2) whether the 
social relationship with their interaction partner 
was disturbed (1 = not at all, to 7 = very much). 
The ratings on these two items were correlated 
for both Party A (r = .69) and Party B (r = .58). 
Accordingly, ratings were aggregated into a 
perceived success to Party A and a perceived 
success to Party B index. Scores were recoded 
so that higher scores indicate more perceived 
success. 
Results
Descriptive statistics Table 1 summarizes the 
means and standard deviations for all dependent 
variables, and gives zero-order correlations. 
Because asymmetrical confl ict structures were 
supposed to evoke less reciprocal cooperation 
sequences, and more transformational sequences, 
we present zero-order correlations separately for 
the asymmetrical (above the diagonal in Table 1) 
and symmetrical confl ict condition (below the 
diagonal in Table 1).
337
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A number of interesting insights derive 
from Table 1. First, in the asymmetrical con-
fl ict condition, perceived success to Party A 
(challenger) did not correlate with anything 
but perceived success to Party B (defendant). 
Party B’s perceived success, in contrast, is 
better the less Party B engaged in problem 
solving (r = –.40) and yielding (r = –.44), and 
the more he or she engaged in contending 
(r = .58). This suggests that in asymmetrical 
conflicts defendants determine, through 
problem solving and contending behavior, 
not only their own but also their counterpart’s 
perceived success. In symmetrical confl icts a 
different pattern emerged. Here, both Party A 
and Party B’s perceived success was positively 
correlated with Party A and Party B’s contending 
behavior (.55 < r < .71), negatively correlated 
with Party A and Party B’s problem solving 
(–.30 < r < –.62), and negatively correlated with 
Party A and Party B’s yielding (–.17 < r < –.49). 
This suggests that in symmetrical conflicts 
challengers determine together through prob-
lem solving, contending, and yielding both 
their own and their counterpart’s perceived 
success. These results are consistent with the 
idea that defendants exert greater control and 
infl uence over the negotiation process, and 
determine the perceived success to a larger 
extent than challengers do. That problem solv-
ing and yielding were negatively correlated, 
and contending was positively correlated with 
personal outcomes, may refl ect the rather dis-
tributive nature of the task and the fact that we 
assessed personal (not joint) outcome.
Another interesting observation from Table 1 
is that in symmetrical confl icts the correlations 
between both parties’ problem solving (r = .47), 
between both parties’ yielding (r = .64), and 
between one party’s problem solving and the 
counterpart’s yielding (r = .60, and r = .73) tend-
encies were all high, positive, and signifi cant. 
This may reflect reciprocal cooperation. A 
comparison with the same correlations in the 
asymmetrical confl ict condition shows lower and 
nonsignifi cant correlations (i.e. r = .14, r = –.44, 
r = .03, and r = –.23, respectively), which may 
refl ect a lack of reciprocal cooperation. 
Confl ict management (Hypotheses 1–3)
Problem solving Hypothesis 1 predicted that chal-
lengers in asymmetrical confl icts employ more 
problem-solving tactics than their defendants; in 
symmetrical confl icts no differences in problem 
solving between challengers are expected. To 
test this hypothesis, we created two indices for 
problem solving (separate for Party A and Party B), 
and submitted these to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. 
Asymmetrical Confl ict) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. 
Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the last 
factor within-dyads.5 Results revealed no overall 
effects for confl ict condition (F(1, 37) = 1.41, ns), 
but a significant conflict condition × party 
interaction (F(1, 37) = 4.67, p < .05). As can be 
Table 1. Zero-order correlations for asymmetrical confl icts (above the diagonal) and symmetrical confl icts 
(below the diagonal): Experiment 1 (N = 39)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
 1. OutcomeA – .49∗∗ –.07 –.22 .34 .10 –.04 –.17 –.24 –.09
 2. OutcomeB .73∗∗ – –.06 –.40∗ .37& .58∗∗ –.27 –.32 .26 –.44∗
 3. Problem solvingA –.36 –.32 – .14 –.37& –.03 .11 –.04 .39∗ .03
 4. Problem solvingB –.51∗∗ –.62∗∗ .47∗∗ – –.39∗ –.58∗∗ –.15 .02 –.23 .85∗∗
 5. ContendingA .63∗∗ .58∗∗ –.44∗ –.48∗∗ – .59∗∗ .14 .30 .23 –.16
 6. ContendingB .56∗∗ .70∗∗ –.26 –.58∗∗ .28 – .12 .26 .39∗ –.49∗∗
 7. AvoidingA –.32 –.40& .01 .54∗∗ –.48∗ –.32 – .45∗∗ –.10 .15
 8. AvoidingB .19 .41& .19 .18 .19 .39& .13 – –.05 .28
 9. YieldingA –.48∗ –.44∗ .50∗∗ .60∗∗ –.23 –.19 –.03 .15 – –.44∗
10. YieldingB –.35 –.18 .73∗∗ .48∗ –.15 –.12 –.17 .25 .64∗∗ –
& p < .10; ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .025.
Note : Subscript A = Party A; B = Party B.
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seen in Table 2, and consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
Party A challengers in asymmetrical confl icts 
engaged in more problem solving when their 
counterpart was in the defendant role; in the 
symmetrical confl ict condition no differences 
among challengers were observed.
Contending Hypothesis 2 predicted that chal-
lengers in asymmetrical confl icts employ more 
contending tactics than their defendants; in 
symmetrical confl icts no differences in con-
tending between challengers were expected. To 
test this hypothesis, we created two indices for 
contending (separate for Party A and Party B), 
and submitted these to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. 
Asymmetrical Confl ict) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. 
Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the last 
factor within-dyads. Results revealed no overall 
effects for confl ict condition (F(1, 37) = 2.29, 
p < .14), but a signifi cant confl ict condition × 
party interaction (F(1, 37) = 4.98, p < .032). 
As can be seen in Table 2, and consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, Party A challengers in asymmetrical 
confl icts engaged in more contending than 
their counterparts in the defendant role; in the 
symmetrical confl ict condition no differences 
in contending between challengers were 
observed. 
Avoiding Hypothesis 3 predicted that chal-
lengers in asymmetrical conflicts employ 
fewer avoiding tactics than their defendants; 
in symmetrical conflicts no differences in 
avoiding between challengers were expected. 
To test this hypothesis, we created two indices 
for avoiding (separate for Party A and Party B), 
and submitted these to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. 
Asymmetrical Confl ict) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. 
Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the last 
factor within-dyads. There were no signifi cant 
effects involving confl ict condition( all F(1, 37) 
< 2.21, all p > .14). However, and consistent with 
Hypothesis 3, in asymmetrical confl icts Party 
A challengers engaged in less avoiding than 
Party B defendants (M = –0.62 vs. M = 0.59; 
t(18) = 2.03, p < .10). 
Yielding We had no specifi c hypothesis regarding 
yielding. For exploratory purposes, we created 
two indices for yielding (separate for Party A and 
Party B), and submitted these to a 2 (Symmetrical 
vs. Asymmetrical Confl ict) × 2 (Role: Party A 
vs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the last 
factor within-dyads. No effects involving confl ict 
condition were found (all Fs < 2.00, ps > .21). 
Perceived success (Hypothesis 4) To test 
Hypothesis 4, we submitted the perceived success 
of Party A and the perceived success of Party B 
to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical Confl ict) 
× 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-model 
ANOVA with the last factor within-dyads. Results 
revealed no main effect for confl ict condition 
(F(1, 37) = 1.85, ns), but a signifi cant confl ict 
Table 2. Means for perceived success and confl ict management as a function of confl ict structure and party role 
Confl ict structure
Asymmetrical Symmetrical
Party A        Party B
Party A Party B(challenger)       (defendant)
Perceived success 2.03a (1.02) 2.95b (1.32) 2.55ab (1.15) 2.50ab (1.48)
Problem solving 0.80a (1.62) –0.37b (1.69) –0.02a (1.45) 0.08ab (2.16)
Contending –0.14a (1.56) –1.54b (1.83) –0.57ab (1.60) –0.54ab (2.07)
Avoiding –0.62x (1.40) 0.59y (1.79) 0.03xy (1.30) 0.16xy (1.48)
Yielding 0.18a (1.21) –0.35a (1.32) 0.60a (1.44) –0.12a (1.27)
Notes : a,b Means not sharing the same superscript differ, according to between-subjects t tests, at p < .05. 
x,y Means not sharing the same superscript differ, according to between-subjects t tests, at p < .10. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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condition × role interaction (F(1, 37) = 5.50, 
p < .025). As can be seen in Table 2, challengers 
in asymmetrical confl icts perceived themselves 
to be less successful than their counterparts in 
the defendant role did; in symmetrical confl icts 
no such difference in perceived success was ob-
served. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported.
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided support for several of 
our predictions. Challengers in asymmetrical 
confl icts engaged in more problem solving, 
more contending, and (somewhat) less avoiding 
than their counterparts in the defendant role 
(Hypotheses 1–3); Also, challengers in asym-
metrical confl icts perceived themselves to be 
less successful than their counterparts in the 
defendant role (Hypothesis 4). 
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we aimed, fi rst of all, to repli-
cate the results of Experiment 1. We make one 
important amendment, however, in that we 
replace the self-reported measure of perceived 
success by observer rating of success. We did 
so to exclude the possibility that self-serving 
tendencies on behalf of the confl ict parties 
biased perceived success ratings and, second, 
to reduce validity threat in terms of common-
source variance. Also, because Experiment 1 
revealed no systematic differences across time 
(see note 3) for confl ict management behavior 
we chose a more effi cient way of assessing con-
fl ict management behavior. Thus, in contrast 
to Experiment 1 we relied on a well-validated 
self-report measure of confl ict management (for 
further detail see the method section below). 
Once again, it is important to note that possible 
correlations between self-reports of confl ict 
management on the one hand, and observer 
reports of confl ict outcomes cannot be attributed 
to common-source bias.
Our second goal with Experiment 2 was to 
further our understanding of the psychological 
processes underlying the behavioral results ob-
served in Experiment 1. In the introduction, we 
argued that the behaviors of challengers and 
defendants in asymmetrical confl icts may be 
due to the Status Quo Bias. Notably, we argued 
that defendants would have resistance to change 
because they were more likely than challengers 
to have a loss frame (Hypothesis 5), and to 
experience more control over the situation 
(Hypothesis 6). We also expected defendants’ 
tendency to be relatively stubborn and intransient 
to translate into person perception. Specifi cally, 
we predicted that challengers in asymmetrical 
confl icts would see their counterparts in the role 
of defendant as less friendly (Hypothesis 7a) and 
more dominant (Hypothesis 7b) than defend-
ants in asymmetrical confl icts would see their 
counterparts in the role of challenger.
Our third and fi nal goal was to examine a 
potential moderator of the effects of confl ict 
structure. Thus far we assumed that confl ict 
parties were motivated by a high concern for 
their own outcomes, and we left unspecifi ed 
whether parties were, or were not, concerned 
about their counterparts’ interests and outcomes. 
Ample research in social and organizational 
psychology has, however, shown that people 
differ in their so-called social value orientation, 
with some being pro-self and concerned about 
their own outcomes only. Others, in contrast, are 
pro-social and concerned with own and others’ 
outcomes, as well as with fairness (McClintock, 
1977; Van Lange, 1999). This distinction be-
tween dispositional pro-self versus pro-social 
orientations explains a wide variety of behaviors, 
including cooperative decision making in social 
dilemmas (e.g. Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & 
Suhre, 1986), concession making in negotiations 
(De Dreu & Boles, 1998; De Dreu & Van Lange, 
1995; Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996), and 
problem solving in confl icts between organ-
izational departments (Nauta, De Dreu, & 
Van de Vaart, 2002). These works suggest that 
challengers and defendants with a pro-social 
orientation will be more likely to engage in 
problem solving and yielding, and less likely 
to engage in contending and avoiding than 
challengers and defendants with a pro-self 
orientation.
Few studies have considered heterogeneity of 
value orientation within confl ict dyads—what 
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happens when a pro-social is paired to a pro-
self rather than another pro-social. Pro-self 
individuals tend to behave non-cooperatively, 
whereas pro-social individuals tend to trust 
others and approach them in a cooperative 
way (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Van Lange, 1999). 
When their counterpart is pro-self, however, 
pro-social individuals change their pro-social 
inclination into non-cooperation to defend 
themselves against others’ non-cooperative 
stance (e.g. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), and 
also because of the moralistic desire to ‘teach 
the other a lesson’ (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; 
Van Lange, 1992). Thus, we expected dyads 
to engage in more cooperative problem 
solving when both parties have a pro-social 
orientation, than when at least one has a pro-
self orientation.
Challengers are, by nature of their position, 
concerned with their counterparts’ goals, inter-
ests, and outcomes—they need to understand 
their counterparts to be able to persuade them 
or to work together toward a mutually satisfactory 
agreement. In contrast, defendants need not 
be concerned with their counterparts’ goals, 
interests, and outcomes—they do not need to 
understand their counterparts to maintain and 
secure the status quo. However, we expect this 
to be true especially for pro-self defendants 
and less for pro-social defendants whose value 
orientation drives them toward a cooperative 
attitude vis-a-vis their counterparts. In other 
words, we expected that the results observed 
in Experiment 1 would be especially true when 
the defendant is pro-self rather than pro-social 
in orientation. Put differently, we expected 
the effects predicted in Hypotheses 1–4 to be 
stronger when parties had a pro-self, rather than 
pro-social orientation.
Method
Design Experiment 2 employed a similar role-
playing methodology as in Experiment 1. 
Participants were provided with background 
information in which a confl ict situation was 
described and then freely interacted with each 
other to discuss the issue. A third student ob-
served the interaction and rated the outcomes 
of both parties. 
Like in Experiment 1, the confl ict situation 
yielded a challenger who wanted to change the 
status quo coupled with either another chal-
lenger (symmetrical confl ict condition) or a 
defendant who wanted to maintain the status 
quo (asymmetrical confl ict condition). The 
design was 2 (Confl ict Structure: Symmetrical 
vs. Asymmetrical) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) 
with Confl ict Structure manipulated between 
dyads and Role manipulated within dyads. The 
dependent variables were the observed confl ict 
behavior and outcomes. 
Participants and procedure Ninety-six psych-
ology students (36 males and 60 females; mean 
age = 21.4) at Utrecht University participated 
in this experiment as part of a workshop on 
group confl ict and negotiation. Initial analyses 
revealed no differences between male and female 
participants, nor between dyads composed of 
same or different gender. Because six participants 
failed to make consistent choices in the social 
value orientations measure (see below), they 
were dropped from the analyses, leaving a total 
sample size of 90.
Participants came to the classroom, were 
asked to complete a measure of social value 
orientation (see below), and received general 
instructions about the workshop. Participants 
were randomly assigned to groups of three 
students, two confl ict parties, and one observer. 
Participants in the role of confl ict party had 
10 minutes to read their role instructions (see 
below). They were to imagine that they were in 
the described situation and to prepare a con-
versation with the other participant. They then 
fi lled out the pre-conversation questionnaire. 
In the meantime, participants in the role of 
observer received rating instructions. Groups 
were then seated in separate parts of the 
classroom where confl ict parties engaged in a 
confl ict resolution process. After 15 minutes, 
the observer ended the discussion. Confl ict 
parties then completed the post-conversation 
questionnaire and observers filled out the 
confl ict rating form. Upon completion of the 
questionnaire, participants were debriefed and 
received additional information about group 
confl ict and negotiation.
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Assessment of social value orientation Social 
value orientation was assessed using the Kuhlman 
and Marshello (1975) decomposed game 
measure—a measurement technique which 
has been demonstrated to have good internal 
consistency (e.g. Liebrand & Van Run, 1985), 
test–retest reliability (Kuhlman, Camac, & 
Cunha, 1986) and construct validity (De Dreu & 
Boles, 1998). Parks (1994) and Kuhlman and 
Marshello (1975) reported moderate negative 
correlations between this measure and a meas-
ure of generalized distrust, i.e. the F scale 
(Robinson & Shaver, 1973). The measure was 
introduced by the following instructions:
Below you see nine decisions in which you have to 
make a choice. Your choice infl uences the amount 
of points you and some other person will get. 
Think of the points as something that is valuable 
to you, to which you attach great importance. The 
other person also attaches great importance to 
the points. Think of the other person as someone 
you do not know, and you will never meet.
Participants were subsequently asked to 
make decisions in nine so-called decomposed 
games. 
In each decomposed game, participants could 
choose from different distributions of out-
comes to themselves and a another (hypothetical) 
person. Outcomes were presented in terms of 
points which were said to have value to both 
themselves as well as to the other person. Par-
ticipants were given a choice among three 
alternatives, each corresponding to one of the 
social value orientations under study. In total, 
there were nine decomposed games, derived 
from prior work of Kuhlman and Marshello 
(1975). An example of the decomposed games 
used in the current study involves a choice among 
Option 1 (50 to Self; 20 to Other), Option 2 (45 
to Self; 45 to Other), and Option 3 (40 to Self; 
0 to Other). Option 1 represents the individualistic 
choice because one’s own outcomes are larger 
(50) than are those in Option 2 (45) or Option 3 
(40). Option 3 represents the competitive 
option, because it provides a greater advantage 
over the other’s outcomes (40 – 0 = 40) than 
either Option 1 (50 – 20 = 30) or Option 2 
(45 – 45 = 0). Finally, Option 2 corresponds to 
a pro-social choice because it provides a larger 
joint outcome (45 + 45 = 90) than either Option 1 
(50 + 20 = 70) or Option 2 (40 + 0 = 40). 
To be classifi ed into one of the three social 
value orientations, participants had to choose 
consistently at least six of the nine trials. Using 
this criteria, 55 (27 in the to be assigned role 
of Party A) were classifi ed as pro-social, 9 as 
competitive, and 26 as individualists. Consistent 
with past work in this area, competitive and 
individualistic participants were put together 
in the pro-self category (18 in the to be assigned 
role of Party A). Six participants failed the 
criterion of making six consistent choices 
(were unclassifi able) and were dropped from 
the analyses, leaving a total sample size of 90 
participants. 
Confl ict task The task was the same as the one 
used in Experiment 1. 
Dependent variables
Conflict management In the post-discussion 
questionnaire, we included the Dutch Test for 
Confl ict Handling (Van de Vliert, 1997). This 
scale measures inaction, contentious behavior 
(‘contending’), concession making (‘yielding’), 
and problem solving. De Dreu et al. (2001) 
showed moderate to strong correlations between 
post-negotiation self-reports on inaction, con-
tentious behavior, concession making, and 
problem solving on the one hand, and observer 
codings for these strategies on the other. 
Sample items included ‘during the negotiation 
I avoided discussing certain issues’ (inaction; 
Cronbach’s α = .63), ‘I fought for good outcomes 
for myself’ (contentious behavior; α = .72), 
‘I made concessions to accommodate the other 
party’ (concession making; α = .81), and ‘I tried 
to find solutions that satisfied my own and 
the other party’s interests’ (problem solving; 
α = .79) (all items: 1 = not at all, to 5 = very much). 
Ratings were averaged into indices of inaction, 
contentious behavior, concession making, and 
problem solving, respectively.
Framing and perceived control Following the 
measure of confl ict management, participants 
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were asked to fi ll out several items intended to 
measure their framing of the confl ict (‘achieving 
my goal would be a gain’, and ‘not reaching my 
goal would be a loss’; both 1 = defi nitely not, to 
7 = very much), and the amount of experienced 
control over their outcomes (‘I have more 
control over the outcome of the confl ict than 
my counterpart’, and ‘my counterpart can 
determine the confl ict outcomes more than 
I can’; both 1 = certainly not, to 7 = defi nitely). 
In each case ratings on the second question were 
reverse coded and within constructs aggregated 
into one index for framing (r = .67 for Party A, 
and r = .61 for Party B; higher scores indicating 
more loss frame) and perceived control (r = .75 
for Party A, and r = .68 for Party B; higher scores 
indicating more perceived control). 
Person perception This was measured by asking 
participants to rate on a 5-point scale their 
counterparts on a number of adjectives. Four of 
these related to others’ friendliness (cooperative–
competitive; friendly–hostile; trustworthy–not 
trustworthy; pleasant–unpleasant) and were 
grouped together into one index of friendliness 
(Cronbach’s α = .81 and .82 for Party A’s per-
ception of others’ friendliness, and Party B’s 
perception of others’ friendliness, respectively). 
Three adjectives related to others’ dominance 
(dominant–submissive; bossy–obedient; 
directive–easy-going), and were grouped together 
into one index of dominance (Cronbach’s α : .81 
and .82 for Party A’s perception of others’ 
dominance, and Party B’s perception of others’ 
dominance, respectively).
Confl ict outcomes In contrast to Experiment 1, 
in which outcome measures were based on 
self-report, we used observer ratings to assess 
confl ict outcomes. Each discussion was rated by 
an independent observer (N = 45). Observers 
rated the confl ict outcome for each party on 
three 5-point scales (Party A(B) got what s/he 
wanted; Party A(B) achieved his/her goals; 
Party A(B) was successful in satisfying his/her 
wishes; always 1 = not at all, to 5 = to a great extent). 
Ratings were within party aggregated into one 
index for outcomes to Party A and outcomes 
to Party B.
Results
Confl ict management (Hypothesis 1–3)
Problem solving Party A’s problem solving and 
Party B’s problem solving were submitted to a 2 
(Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical Confl ict Struc-
ture) × 2 (Party A is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) × 2 
(Party B is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Role: Party A 
vs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVA with the last 
factor within-dyads. Results showed, fi rst of all, 
an interaction between confl ict structure and 
role (F(1, 82) = 4.94, p < .03). As can be seen in 
Table 3, Party A’s challengers in asymmetrical 
conflicts engaged in more problem solving 
than their counterparts in the defendant role; 
in symmetrical confl icts no difference between 
both challengers A and B were signifi cant. This 
replicates the results obtained in Experiment 1 
and implies new support for Hypothesis 1.
Second, results showed a trend toward a main 
effect for Party B’s value orientation, so that dyads 
engaged in more problem solving when Party 




Party A        Party B
Party A Party B(challenger)       (defendant)
Confl ict outcome 56.21a (9.08) 70.30b (10.32) 64.82ab (9.15) 67.70ab (11.48)
Problem solving 5.08a (1.62) 4.41b (1.69) 4.92ab (1.45) 4.67ab (2.16)
Notes : a,b Means not sharing the same superscript differ, according to between-subjects t tests, at p < .05. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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B was pro-social rather than pro-self (M = 4.97 
vs. M = 4.53, F(1, 82) = 2.94, p < .10). No other 
effects involving social value orientation were 
signifi cant. Thus, social value orientation does 
not moderate the infl uence of confl ict structure 
on confl ict outcomes.
Contending Party A’s contending and Party B’s 
contending were submitted to a 2 (Symmetrical 
vs. Asymmetrical Confl ict Structure) × 2 (Party A 
is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Party B is Pro-
social vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) 
mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor 
within-dyads. Results showed, fi rst of all, a main 
effect for confl ict structure (F(1, 82) = 4.97, 
p < .03). Asymmetrical confl icts produced more 
contending than symmetrical confl icts (M = 4.57 
vs. M = 4.33). However, because there was no 
qualifying interaction with role (F(1, 82) < 1), we 
do not replicate the results in Experiment 1. 
Second, results showed a main effect for Party 
B’s value orientation, so that dyads engaged in 
less contending when Party B was pro-social 
rather than pro-self (M = 4.32 vs. M = 4.57, 
F(1, 82) = 7.40, p < .01). No other effects involving 
social value orientation were signifi cant. Thus, 
social value orientation does not moderate the 
infl uence of confl ict structure on contending.
Avoiding Party A’s avoiding and Party B’s 
avoiding were submitted to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. 
Asymmetrical Confl ict Structure) × 2 (Party A is 
Pro-social vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Party B is Pro-social 
vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-
model ANOVA with the last factor within-dyads. 
Results only showed a main effect for Party B’s 
value orientation, so that dyads engaged in more 
avoiding when Party B was pro-social rather than 
pro-self (M = 3.57 vs. M = 3.30, F(1, 82) = 6.94, 
p < .01). No other effects involving social value 
orientation were signifi cant. Thus, social value 
orientation does not moderate the infl uence of 
confl ict structure on avoiding.
Yielding Party A’s yielding and Party B’s yield-
ing were submitted to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. 
Asymmetrical Confl ict Structure) × 2 (Party A 
is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Party B is Pro-
social vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) 
mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor within-
dyads. Results showed a main effect for Party B’s 
value orientation, so that dyads engaged in 
more yielding when Party B was pro-social 
rather than pro-self (M = 4.20 vs. M = 3.89; 
F(1, 82) = 6.86, p < .01). Similarly, there was a 
main effect for Party A’s value orientation, so 
that dyads engaged in more yielding when Party 
A was pro-social rather than pro-self (M = 4.10 
vs. M = 3.84, F(1, 82) = 5.67, p < .02). No other 
effects involving social value orientation were 
signifi cant. Thus, social value orientation does 
not moderate the infl uence of confl ict structure 
on yielding.
Confl ict outcomes (Hypothesis 4) Party A’s out-
comes and Party B’s outcomes were submitted 
to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical Confl ict 
Structure) × 2 (Party A is Pro-social vs. Pro-
self) × 2 (Party B is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) × 2 
(Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVA 
with the last factor within-dyads. Results showed, 
fi rst of all, a main effect for confl ict structure 
(F(1, 82) = 8.94, p < .005), and a qualifying 
interaction between confl ict structure and role 
(F(1, 82) = 4.91, p < .03). As can be seen in Table 3, 
Party A challengers in asymmetrical confl icts 
achieved lower outcomes than their counterparts 
in Party B in the defendant role. This replicates 
the results obtained in Experiment 1 and implies 
new support for Hypothesis 4.
Second, results showed a main effect for Party B’s 
value orientation, so that dyads achieved higher 
outcomes together when Party B was pro-social 
rather than pro-self (M = 66.00 vs. M = 59.48, 
F(1, 82) = 8.52, p < .005). No other effects involv-
ing social value orientation were signifi cant. 
Thus, social value orientation does not moderate 
the infl uence of confl ict structure on confl ict 
outcomes.
Loss framing and perceived control (Hypotheses 
5–6) Loss framing by Party A and loss framing 
by Party B were submitted to a 2 (Symmetrical 
vs. Asymmetrical Confl ict Structure) × 2 (Party A 
is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Party B is Pro-social 
vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-
model ANOVA with the last factor within-dyads. 
The only signifi cant effect was an interaction 
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between confl ict structure and role (F(1, 82) = 
11.13, p < .001). As can be seen in Table 4, Party A 
(challenger) experienced less of a loss-frame 
than Party B (defendant) in the asymmetrical 
confl ict condition, whereas Parties A and B did 
not differ in the symmetrical confl ict condition. 
This supports Hypothesis 5 and our reasoning 
that defendants are relatively resistant to change 
because they are in a loss-frame more than their 
challenger is.
Perceived control by Party A and perceived 
control by Party B were submitted to a 2 (Sym-
metrical vs. Asymmetrical Confl ict Structure) × 2 
(Party A is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Party B is Pro-
social vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) 
mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor 
within-dyads. Results revealed a signifi cant main 
effect for confl ict structure (F(1, 82) = 19.71, 
p < .001), and a qualifying interaction between 
confl ict structure and role (F(1, 82) = 8.40, 
p < .005). As can be seen in Table 4, Party A 
(challenger) experienced less control than 
Party B (defendant) in the asymmetrical confl ict 
condition, whereas Party A and Party B did not 
differ in the symmetrical confl ict condition. This 
supports Hypothesis 6 and our reasoning that 
defendants are relatively resistant to change 
because they are in a more powerful position 
than their challenger is.
Person perception (Hypotheses 7a–7b) Other’s 
friendliness perceived by Party A and other’s 
friendliness perceived by Party B were submitted 
to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical Confl ict 
Structure) × 2 (Party A is Pro-social vs. Pro-
self) × 2 (Party B is Pro-social vs. Pro-self) × 2 
(Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-model ANOVA 
with the last factor within-dyads. This revealed 
a main effect for Party A’s social value orien-
tation, showing that Party A perceived party B 
as friendlier when Party A had a pro-social rather 
than a pro-self orientation (M = 4.77 vs. M = 4.06; 
F(1, 82) = 5.89, p < .025). A similar, albeit less 
strong, main effect for Party B’s social value 
orientation showed that Party B perceived party A 
as friendlier when Party B had a pro-social 
rather than a pro-self orientation (M = 4.42 vs. 
M = 3.93; F(1, 82) = 3.07, p < .084) (marginal). 
Finally, results revealed a trend toward an 
interaction among confl ict structure and role 
(F(1, 82) = 3.24, p < .075) (marginal). Cell 
means in Table 4 show that party A (challenger) 
perceives party B (defendant) as less friendly 
than party B perceives party A in asymmetrical 
conflicts, whereas there appears to be no 
divergence in perceptions of friendliness in 
symmetrical confl icts. This matches our notion 
that defendants may be more stubborn, evasive, 
and resistant to change than challengers, and 
provides support for Hypothesis 7a.
Other’s dominance perceived by Party A and 
other’s dominance perceived by Party B were 
submitted to a 2 (Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical 
Confl ict Structure) × 2 (Party A is Pro-social 
vs. Pro-self) × 2 (Party B is pro-social vs. pro-
self) × 2 (Role: Party A vs. Party B) mixed-model 
ANOVA with the last factor within-dyads. This 
only revealed an interaction among confl ict 
Table 4. Means for confl ict-related perceptions as a function of confl ict structure and party role: Experiment 2
Confl ict structure
Asymmetrical Symmetrical
Party A        Party B
Party A Party B(challenger)       (defendant)
Loss-frame 2.97b 3.30a 3.20a 3.04ab
Perceived control 3.78c 5.13b 4.19a 4.36a
Others’ friendliness 2.39b 2.99a 2.71a 2.61ab
Others’ dominance 4.17c 3.47ab 3.68a 4.06bc
Note : a,b,c Means not sharing the same superscript differ, according to between-subjects t tests, at p < .05.
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structure and role (F(1, 82) = 7.09, p < .01). 
As can be seen in Table 4, Party B is perceived 
as more dominant in asymmetrical rather 
than symmetrical confl icts, and Party A is per-
ceived as less dominant in asymmetrical rather 
than symmetrical conflicts; this supports 
Hypothesis 7b.
Discussion
Results replicated and extended those of 
Experiment 1. Again, and consistent with 
Hypothesis 4, we found that challengers 
achieved lower outcomes when paired to a 
defendant (asymmetrical conflict) than to 
another challenger. Consistent with Hypoth-
esis 1, we found once again that challengers 
in asymmetrical conflicts engaged in more 
problem solving than their counterparts in the 
defendant role, than with another challenger. 
Importantly, we did not replicate the results 
regarding contending and avoiding obtained 
in Experiment 1. Although we cannot exclude 
that this failure to replicate effects is partly due 
to the fact that we used self-report instead of 
observer ratings of behavior, this may suggest 
that confl ict outcomes are primarily the result 
of asymmetries in problem solving. We return 
to this in the general discussion.
In addition to Experiment 1, we included 
perceptual measures in Experiment 2. We found 
that in asymmetrical confl icts defendants are 
in a loss-frame more than their challengers. 
Also, defendants perceive more control over 
the situation. Finally, defendants are perceived 
as less friendly and more dominant than their 
challengers. These three findings together 
strongly support the notion that those defending 
the status quo are better positioned than those 
challenging the status quo, and corroborates 
speculations in other research reports (e.g. 
Keltner & Robinson, 1997; Robinson & Keltner, 
1996; Garcia et al., 2001; Kluwer, 1998).
Social value orientations
In Experiment 2 we included both parties’ 
pro-self versus pro-social value orientation as 
a potential moderator of the confl ict struc-
ture effects. However, no interaction between 
social value orientation, conflict structure, 
and participant role was found—the effects of 
confl ict structure on perceptions, motivation, 
and confl ict behaviors hold for both pro-self and 
pro-social individuals. At the same time, we did 
fi nd a number of effects for parties’ social value 
orientation that merit discussion. 
Results for conflict management showed 
that Party B engaged in more problem solving 
and less contending when s/he was pro-social 
rather than pro-self, and that Party B and Party A 
engaged in more yielding when they were pro-
social rather than pro-self. Also, dyads achieved 
higher outcomes when Party B was pro-social 
rather than pro-self. Finally, Party A and B saw 
each other as friendlier when they were pro-social 
rather than pro-self. Because no interactions 
involving confl ict structure were observed, we 
cannot conclude that the stronger effects for 
Party B were due to the fact that Party B was 
the defendant in half of the cases. Furthermore, 
means for Party A went in the same direction 
but did not reach signifi cance. For some reason, 
effects for social value orientation were stronger 
when participants were in the role of Party B, 
but not qualitatively different when participants 
were in the role of Party A. We believe this points 
to the fact that role descriptions have provided 
Party B with a slightly ‘weaker situation’ than 
Party A, allowing person-based tendencies to 
come out more in Party B than in Party A. 
We reasoned that dispute resolution pro-
cesses are more constructive when parties have 
a pro-social rather than pro-self orientation. 
Furthermore, based on the so-called triangle 
hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Steinel & 
De Dreu, 2004; Van Lange, 1992), one would 
expect constructive processes only when both 
parties are pro-social. This is because pro-socials 
tend to adapt to, and adopt, the less constructive 
behavior by their pro-self counterparts. The lack 
of interactions between Party A and Party B’s 
social value orientation on any of the measures 
in Experiment 2 goes against this triangle 
hypothesis. This may indicate that the triangle 
hypothesis is limited to specifi c situations, such 
as prisoner’s dilemma type of games (Miller & 
Holmes, 1975) and does not necessarily gen-
eralize to negotiation and dispute resolution 
(cf. Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). 
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Indeed, close inspection of the relevant liter-
ature suggests rather limited evidence for this 
triangle hypothesis. While initial evidence has 
been provided using prisoner’s dilemma games 
(Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), follow-up work using 
slight variations of this game failed to provide 
supportive evidence (Miller & Holmes, 1975). 
Studies into cooperative behavior in so-called 
chicken dilemma games and trust games likewise 
failed to provide asymmetrical adaptation of pro-
socials to competitive behavior by their counter-
part (Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel, & Wolters, 1986), 
and there is little evidence for the underlying 
proposition that pro-social individuals have 
more heterogeneous beliefs about others’ value 
orientation than those with a pro-self orientation 
(e.g. Iedema & Poppe, 1999). Work by Parks and 
Rumble (2001; also see Parks, Sanna, & Berel, 
2001) found behavioral assimilation by pro-
socials more than by pro-selves but only after 
substantial delay. In short, it appears the triangle 
hypothesis has some validity in rather specifi c 
circumstances (i.e. prisoner dilemma games) 
and that in other social decision making settings 
symmetrical adaptation is the rule rather than 
the exception. Clearly, however, more systematic 
research into this issue is greatly needed.
Conclusions and general discussion
Although conflict research and theory has 
developed in the past three decades, few studies 
dealt with the fact that the mere structure of 
the confl ict can have important implications 
for parties’ cognitions, motivational goals, 
social perceptions, behavioral interactions, and 
conflict outcomes. Granted, in some areas, 
such as negotiations, symmetrical structures 
have been studied extensively, and in other 
areas, such as marital interaction and judicial 
disputes, asymmetrical structures have been 
covered in quite some detail. Yet as far as we 
know the current research is the fi rst to dir-
ectly compare, in an experimental setting, the 
possible consequences of symmetrical versus 
asymmetrical confl icts. Below we discuss these 
findings, along with some suggestions for 
future research and implications for confl ict 
and negotiation research. We also address the 
results for social value orientation obtained in 
Experiment 2 in some more detail, and we end 
with some general conclusions.
Confl ict structures
Several findings were consistent across the 
two experiments. In both studies, we found no 
differences in problem solving, contending, 
yielding, avoiding, and confl ict outcomes be-
tween both challengers A and B in the sym-
metrical confl ict conditions. Clearly, specifi c role 
instructions, however minor, had no meaningful 
infl uence on the course and outcome of the 
dispute resolution process. Similarly, in the 
symmetrical confl ict condition of Experiment 2 
no differences among challengers were found 
in loss framing, perceived control, and person 
perception. However, and consistent with our 
predictions, meaningful differences in confl ict 
behavior, perceptions, and outcomes between 
challengers and defendants were found in the 
asymmetrical confl ict conditions. As predicted, 
challengers engaged in more problem solv-
ing and contending, and in less avoiding, 
had less of a loss-frame, perceived lower con-
trol, and obtained lower outcomes than their 
counterparts in the role of defendant. These 
fi ndings are consistent with our reasoning that 
in asymmetrical confl icts challengers need to 
be pro-active and approach their defendant 
who, because of the Status Quo Bias, is relatively 
stubborn, evasive, and domineering. In short, 
asymmetrical confl icts are less likely to run 
a constructive course, and are more likely to 
escalate into impasse or win–lose outcomes, 
compared to symmetrical confl icts. 
At the outset we noted that recent work indi-
cates that feeling powerful may instigate ap-
proach motivation and concomitant action 
tendencies (cf. Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 
2003). At fi rst blush this seems to go against our 
reasoning, and fi ndings, that defendants with 
concomitantly more power are less pro-active in 
initiating and reciprocating problem-solving and 
contending tendencies than their challengers 
and are, in fact, more likely to remain inactive. 
However, it may very well be that defendants with 
a greater sense of power than challengers are 
initially predisposed to act and move but that 
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this basic and habitual tendency is overruled by
sophisticated strategic analysis of the pros and 
cons of (not) acting. That parties to a confl ict 
can and do overcome their initial and habit-
ual tendencies has been shown in work on the 
social functions of emotions in confl ict and 
negotiation, which revealed that contagion-like 
processes emerge but do not affect behavior; 
behavioral responses to other’s emotions 
were grounded in a strategic analysis of the 
information contained in the counterpart’s 
emotion (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 
2004a, 2004b). This work also indicates a way 
to test this possibility, namely by varying the 
extent to which defendants and challengers are 
able and motivated to process information—
if they can, strategic considerations (not) to act 
will overrule their habitual tendencies; but if 
they cannot, habitual tendencies take preced-
ence over strategic inclinations and defendants 
may become even more pro-active than their 
challengers. 
Although our predictions and analyses were 
focused on differences in psychological processes 
and behavioral tendencies between challenger 
and defendant in asymmetrical confl icts, our 
design allows us to examine whether confl ict 
structures infl uence dispute resolution pro-
cesses because it impacts challengers or defend-
ants, or both. In neither Experiment 1 nor 
Experiment 2 did fi nd we overall main effects 
for confl ict structure. Inspection of cell means 
in Table 2 (Experiment 1) and Table 3 (Experi-
ment 2) shows that with regard to confl ict out-
comes and confl ict management challengers 
in symmetrical confl icts take positions that are 
intermediate and not-signifi cantly different 
from those taken by challengers and defendants 
in asymmetrical conflicts. Similar patterns 
emerged in Table 4 (Experiment 2) where 
with regard to framing, perceived control, and 
person perceptions, challengers in symmetrical 
confl icts took positions that were intermediate 
and not-signifi cantly different from those taken 
by challengers and defendants in asymmet-
rical confl icts. These fi ndings together allow 
the cautious conclusion that conflict struc-
ture has no meaningful impact on the overall 
group-level processes and outcomes but does 
exert meaningful infl uences on the within-
group, between party processes and outcomes. 
Furthermore, we have no evidence that it is either 
the challenger or the defendant who is primarily 
responsible for the different processes and out-
comes observed in asymmetrical compared to 
symmetrical confl icts—both challenger and 
defendant seem to have an impact and jointly 
determine the course of action and ultimate 
outcome of the dispute resolution process.
In Experiment 1, where we worked with ob-
served instances of confl ict management, we 
found circumstantial evidence for reciprocal 
cooperation in symmetrical confl icts, and lack of 
reciprocal sequences in asymmetrical confl icts. 
This was based on correlations and thus re-
presents a rather crude assessment of behavioral 
interaction sequences. Future research into 
symmetrical and asymmetrical confl icts would 
benefi t tremendously from the type of sequential 
analyses employed by Weingart and Olekalns 
and their colleagues (e.g. Olekalns, Brett, & 
Weingart, 2003; Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & 
Genovese, 1999). The rather broad coding 
intervals used in Experiment 1 and the use of 
retrospective self-report measures in Experi-
ment 2 do not allow the Markov-chain type of 
analysis that these scholars offer. The current 
fi ndings and conclusions may, however, serve 
as the basis for specifi c predictions to be tested 
using such more fi ne-grained coding of behavior 
at the level of speaker turns.
Current fi ndings suggest that it may not only 
be the objective structure of the confl ict, but 
also the way it is perceived, that affects how 
parties approach and respond to each other. For 
example, it could be argued that sellers and buyers 
in trade negotiations are actually in an asym-
metrical confl ict, with the seller defending the 
status quo—the selling price asked—and the 
buyer challenging it (cf. Kahneman et al., 
1990; see also Donohue & Taylor, 2007). 
This asymmetrical confl ict structure accounts 
for the differences in gain–loss framing, perceived 
control, and differential outcomes achieved by 
seller and buyers. Related, it may well be that 
the objective structure of the confl ict has less 
impact than the subjective experience of con-
fl ict structures, with objectively symmetrical 
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structures being perceived as asymmetrical by 
one or both parties. Such subjective perceptions 
may turn out to be more critical in driving 
conflict cognition and behavior. Obviously, 
future research is needed to test these ideas 
more systematically. 
Thus far we have implicitly assumed that con-
fl icts are either symmetrical or asymmetrical. 
However, in many cases, such as negotiations, 
multiple issues are dealt with in a more or 
less simultaneous fashion and it is quite likely 
that on some issues symmetry exists whereas 
on other issues asymmetry exists. For example, 
during contract negotiations, management’s top 
priority is to increase labor’s upfront costs for 
prescription medications, whereas labor wants it 
to stay as is; labor wants to win the ability to adopt 
fl exible start and stop times, but management 
has no interest in discussing this. Examining 
such mixed situations is of great interest and 
importance, and the current research may 
provide a basis for such more complex analyses 
both of strategic choices participants make and 
of the quality of the agreements they ultimately 
reach.
Before moving to some practical implications 
of our results, we should acknowledge that the 
use of relatively short-lived role simulations 
with individuals not knowing each other and not 
anticipating future interaction provides high 
internal validity, but not necessarily high external 
validity. In many confl icts, parties do share a 
history and a future, confl ict issues may have 
important repercussions, and confl ict outcomes 
may have vital consequences for parties’ well-
being and economic prosperity. While these 
aspects were not part of the role simulations used 
in the current research, the pattern of results 
we obtained closely follows those obtained in 
real-life disputes among married couples (e.g. 
Kluwer et al., 1997) as well as in judicial disputes 
between district attornies and public defenders 
(Garcia et al., 2001). Whereas this other work 
may be higher in external validity, and at the least 
shows challenger–defendant patterns in specifi c 
applied contexts, the current work contributes 
to these and other literatures by establishing 
causal direction as well as by showing that specifi c 
context does not necessarily moderate the more 
basic dispute resolution tendencies that emerge 
as a function of confl ict structure. 
Implications for third party intervention
Our fi ndings have implications for third party 
interventions. Third parties should be aware 
of the structure of the conflict when they 
engage in mediation between two conflict 
parties. Our results suggest that asymmetrical 
confl icts are more diffi cult to mediate than 
symmetrical confl icts, because of their higher 
chance of escalation and stalemate due to less 
reciprocation of problem solving. Moreover, 
the results show that challengers receive lower 
confl ict outcomes than defendants, which can be 
a risk for long-term (working) relations because 
challengers may experience injustice. Work 
by Jehn, Rupert, and Nauta (2006) has indeed 
shown that asymmetry of confl icts is negatively 
associated with satisfaction with mediation. 
Third parties should therefore acknowledge 
and address asymmetries in confl ict. However, 
this is not an easy task because for a mediation 
to succeed, it is important that both parties per-
ceive the mediator as impartial and unbiased. 
By giving differential attention to one of the 
parties—for example allowing the challenger 
more speaking time than the defendant—a 
third party runs the risk of being perceived as 
partial and biased. Tactics that may be useful 
for mediators are, fi rst, to ensure equal speaking 
time for both parties. Another tactic may be to 
let the parties redefi ne their confl ict issue in 
more symmetrical terms. For example, when 
an employee and his or her supervisor argue 
about working hours that an employee wants to 
change whereas the supervisor does not, a third 
party may ask about the underlying interests and 
help both parties redefi ne the confl ict issue in 
terms of these interests—e.g. supervisor lacking 
capacity, employee wanting more time to spend 
with his or her family. Underlying interests are 
by defi nition goals that parties strive for, and 
therefore refl ect change for both parties rather 
than a status quo of one of the parties. 
Conclusions
In two experiments we showed that in asymmetrical 
confl icts challengers engage in more problem 
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solving and, to some extent, more contending 
and less avoiding than their counterparts in the 
role of defendant. These strategic choices came 
together with less perceived control, less loss 
framing, and lower personal outcomes. These 
fi ndings are consistent with previous conclusions 
that were based on correlational designs and 
oftentimes did not allow a clear-cut separation 
of structure effects and gender (as in marital 
confl ict interactions) or occupational status (as 
in judicial disputes). However, together with 
these previous works we can conclude that 
regardless of the specifi c issues being addressed, 
or the specifi c context within which the confl ict 
takes place, defendants of the status quo are 
in a much better position during asymmetrical 
confl icts than their challengers are. 
Recall that Coombs (1987) argued that some 
confl icts arise because opposing individuals 
want the same thing and must settle for dif-
ferent things, whereas other conflicts arise 
because individuals want different things and 
must settle for the same thing. We agreed with 
Coombs that these two broad classes of confl ict 
structures ‘exhaust the domain of conflict’ 
(p. 362), but argued that a further distinction 
between symmetrical and asymmetrical struc-
tures was needed to fully understand how 
confl ict structures affect cognition, motivation, 
and confl ict behavior. The current research 
supports our argument—it matters whether 
parties together seek to establish change, or 
instead have to decide whether to change the 
situation or not. The latter question appears to 
be more diffi cult and is about situations prone 
to confl ict escalation.
Notes
1. In the present context asymmetrical versus 
symmetrical structure refers to the extent to 
which one or both disputants seek change. In 
some work concerned with group negotiation, 
the terms symmetrical and asymmetrical have 
been used to describe situations in which all 
members opposed each other (symmetrical), or 
in which some members had aligned preferences 
that deviated from those of a minority member 
(e.g. Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; Polzer, Mannix, 
& Neale, 1998; Ten Velden, Beersma, & 
De Dreu, 2007). Also, the terms asymmetrical 
versus symmetrical have sometimes been used to 
refer to differences in dependency and power 
among disputants. Again, this is a different 
situation that is orthogonal to the current focus.
2. Note that this reasoning is in contrast to 
research and theory suggesting that feeling 
powerful induces an approach motivation and 
tendency to act (e.g. Keltner et al., 2003; 
Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 
2006). We return to this in the general 
discussion.
3. Readers familiar with the negotiation literature 
may be interested in whether the tasks we 
used had so-called integrative potential—the 
possibility for parties to integrate seemingly 
opposed aspirations into solutions that provided 
both with relatively high outcomes. Our tasks 
did not have this possibility explicitly built 
in (as in most point-value negotiation tasks; 
see De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003), but such 
creative solutions were neither excluded nor 
prohibited. However, because our focus was on 
confl ict cognition, interpersonal perceptions, 
and interaction processes, we did not examine 
in-depth the type of solutions parties reached, 
and limited this part of the analysis to felt 
(Experiment 1) and observed (Experiment 2) 
success.
4. Exploratory analyses were performed to see 
whether across time behavioral patterns changed 
in interaction with confl ict structure and role. 
This was not the case—we only found that over 
time dyads engaged in more problem solving 
and less forcing; the prevalence of avoiding and 
yielding did not change over time. The fi rst 
author may be contacted for further detail.
5. We decided to analyze each confl ict 
management strategy separately, rather than 
as one single analysis for two reasons. First, 
strategies are not necessarily correlated and 
theoretically it is possible that effects show on 
one strategy but not others. Second, such an 
overall analysis could reveal that some confl ict 
management strategies are preferred more than 
others, but since we had no predictions that 
would complicate interpretation.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a research grant 
awarded by the Van der Gaag Foundation to 
Carsten K. W. De Dreu and Aukje Nauta, and by 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
350
an Aspasia Grant awarded by the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientifi c Research (NWO) to 
Esther Kluwer. 
References
Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2002). 
Integrative and distributive negotiation in small 
groups: Effects of task structure, decision rule, 
and social motive. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 87, 227–252.
Bottom, W. P., & Studt, A. (1993). Framing and 
distributive aspects of integrative negotiation. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 56, 459–474.
Brett, J. M., Shapiro, D. L., & Lytle, A. L. 
(1998). Breaking the bonds of reciprocity in 
negotiations. Academy of Management Journal, 
41, 410–424.
Carnevale, P. J., & Pruitt, D. G. (1992). Negotiation 
and mediation. Annual Review of Psychology, 
43, 531–582.
Christensen, A., & Heavey, C. L. (1990). Gender 
and social structure in the demand/withdraw 
pattern of marital confl ict. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 59, 73–81.
Coombs, C. H. (1987). The structure of confl ict. 
American Psychologist, 42, 355–363.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Beersma, B., Steinel, W., & 
Van Kleef, G. A. (2007). The psychology of 
negotiation: Principles and basic processes. 
In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), 
Handbook of basic principles in social psychology 
(2nd ed., pp. 608–629). New York: Guilford.
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Boles, T. (1998). Share and 
share alike or winner takes all? Impact of social 
value orientation on the choice and recall of 
decision heuristics in negotiation. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
76, 253–267. 
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Carnevale, P. J. (2003). 
Motivational bases of information processing 
and strategy in confl ict and negotiation. In 
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Adances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 235–291). 
De Dreu, C. K. W., Carnevale, P. J. D., Emans, 
B. J. M., & Van de Vliert, E. (1994). Effects of 
gain loss frames in negotiation: Loss aversion, 
mismatching, and frame adoption. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 60, 90–107.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Evers, A., Beersma, B., Kluwer, 
E. S., & Nauta, A. (2001). A theory-based 
measure of confl ict management strategies in 
the workplace. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 
22, 645–668.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Nauta, A., & Van de Vliert, E. 
(1995). Self-serving evaluation of confl ict 
behavior and escalation of the dispute. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 25, 2049–2066.
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). 
Impact of social value orientation on negotiator 
cognition and behavior. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1177–1188.
De Dreu, C. K. W., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, 
S. (2000). Infl uence of social motives on 
integrative negotiation: A meta-analytical review 
and test of two theories. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78, 889–905.
Donohue, W. A., & Taylor, P. J. (2007, July). 
Role effects in negotiation: The one-down 
phenomenon. Negotiation Journal, 301–331.
Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: 
The impact of power on stereotyping. American 
Psychologist, 48, 621–628.
Fobian, C. S., & Christensen-Szalanski, J. J.  J. 
(1993). Ambiguity and liability negotiations: The 
effects of the negotiators’ role and the sensitivity 
zone. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 54, 277–298.
Fobian, C. S., & Christensen-Szalanski, J. J. J. 
(1994). Settling liability disputes: The effects of 
asymmetric levels of ambiguity on negotiations. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 60, 108–138. 
Garcia, S. M., Darley, J. M., & Robinson, R. J. 
(2001). Morally questionable tactics: 
Negotiations between district attorneys and 
public defenders. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 27, 731–743.
Harinck, F., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2004). 
Negotiating interests or values and reaching 
integrative agreements: The importance of time 
pressure and temporary impasses. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 595–612.
Harinck, F., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Vianen, 
A. E. M. (2000). The impact of confl ict issues 
on fi xed-pie perceptions, problem solving, 
and integrative outcomes in negotiation. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 81, 329–358.
Heavey, C. L., Layne, C., & Christensen, A. (1993). 
Gender and confl ict structure in marital 
interaction: A replication and extension. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
61, 16–27.
351
De Dreu et al. conflict structures and social interaction processes
Iedema, J., & Poppe, M. (1999). Expectations 
of others’ social value orientations in specifi c 
and general populations. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1443–1450.
Janssen, O., & Van de Vliert, E. (1996). Concern 
for other’s goals: Key to de-escalation of confl ict. 
International Journal of Confl ict Management, 7, 
99–120.
Jehn, K. A., Rupert, J., & Nauta, A. (2006). The 
effects of confl ict asymmetry on mediation 
outcomes: Satisfaction, work motivation and 
absenteeism. International Journal of Confl ict 
Management, 17, 96–109.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. 
(1990). Experimental tests of the endowment 
effect and the Coase-theorem. Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, 1325–1348.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, 
values, and frames. American Psychologist, 39, 
341–350.
Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). The 
social interaction basis of cooperators’ and 
competitors’ beliefs about others. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
16, 66–91.
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. 
(2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. 
Psychological Review, 110, 265–284. 
Keltner, D., & Robinson, R. J. (1997). Defending 
the status quo: Power and bias in social confl ict. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 
1066–1077.
Klinetob, N. A., & Smith, D. A. (1996). Demand–
withdraw communication in marital interaction: 
Tests of interspousal contingency and gender 
role hypotheses. Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 58, 945–957.
Kluwer, E. S. (1998). Responses to gender 
inequality in the division of family work: 
The status quo effect. Social Justice Research, 11, 
337–357.
Kluwer, E. S., Heesink, J. A. M., & Van de Vliert, E. 
(1996). Marital confl ict about the division 
of household labor and paid work. Journal of 
Marriage and the Family, 58, 958–969.
Kluwer, E. S., Heesink, J. A. M., & Van de Vliert, E. 
(1997). The marital dynamics of confl ict over 
the division of labor. Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 59, 635–653.
Kluwer, E. S., Heesink, J. A. M., & Van de Vliert, E. 
(2000). The division of labor in close 
relationships: An asymmetrical confl ict issue. 
Personal Relationships, 7, 263–282.
Kuhlman, D. M., Camac, C., & Cunha, D. A. (1986). 
Individual differences in social orientation. 
In H. Wilke, D. Messick, & C. Rutte (Eds.), 
Experimental Social Dilemmas (pp. 151–176). 
New York: Verlag Peter Lang.
Kuhlman, D. M., & Marshello, A. (1975). 
Individual differences in game motivation as 
moderators of preprogrammed strategic effects 
in prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 32, 922–931.
Liebrand, W. B. G., Jansen, R. W. T. L., Rijken, 
V. M., & Suhre, C. J. M. (1986). Might over 
morality: Social values and the perceptions 
of other players in experimental games. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 
203–215.
Liebrand, W. B. G., & Van Run, G. (1985). The 
effects of social motives across two cultures 
on behavior in social dilemmas. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 86–102.
Liebrand, W. B. G., Wilke, H. A. M., Vogel, R., & 
Wolters, F. J. M. (1986). Value orientation 
and conformity. Journal of Confl ict Resolution, 
30, 77–97.
McClintock, C. (1977). Social motivations in 
settings of outcome interdependence. In 
D. Druckman (Ed.), Negotiations: Social 
psychological perspective (pp. 49–77). 
Beverly Hills: Sage.
Miller, D. T., & Holmes, J. G. (1975). The role 
of situational restrictiveness on self-fulfi lling 
prophecies: A theoretical and empirical 
extension of Kelley and Stahelski’s triangle 
hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 31, 661–673.
Nauta, A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van der Vaart, T. 
(2002). Social value orientation, organizational 
goal concerns and interdepartmental problem-
solving behavior. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 23, 199–213.
Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1985). The 
effects of framing and negotiator overconfi dence 
on bargaining behaviors and outcomes. Academy 
of Management Journal, 28, 34–49. 
Olekalns, M., Brett, J. M., & Weingart, L. R. 
(2003). Phases, transitions, and interruptions. 
Modelling processes in multi-party negotiations. 
International Journal of Confl ict Management, 14, 
191–211.
Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2000). Negotiating 
optimal outcomes: The role of strategic 
sequences in competitive negotiations. Human 
Communication Research, 24, 528–560.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
352
Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2005). Moments 
in time: Meta-cognition, trust, and outcomes 
in dyadic negotiations. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1696–1707.
Olekalns, M., Smith, P. L., & Walsh, T. (1996). The 
process of negotiating: Strategies, timing and 
outcomes. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 67, 61–77.
Parks, C. (1994). The predictive ability of social 
values in resource dilemmas and public goods. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 
431–438.
Parks, C. D., & Rumble, A. C. (2001). Elements 
of reciprocity and social value orientation. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 
1301–1309.
Parks, C. D., Sanna, L. J., & Berel, S. R. (2001). 
Actions of similar others as inducements to 
cooperate in social dilemmas. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 345–354.
Peirce, R. S., Pruitt, D. G., & Czaja, S. J. (1993). 
Complainant–respondent differences in 
procedural choice. International Journal of Confl ict 
Management, 4, 199–222.
Polzer, J. T., Mannix, E. A., & Neale, M. A. (1998). 
Interest alignment and coalitions in multiparty 
negotiation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 
42–54.
Pruitt, D. G. (1998). Social confl ict. In D. T. 
Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds), The 
handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, 4th ed., 
pp. 470–503). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Pruitt, D. G., & Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years 
of experimental gaming: Critique, synthesis, 
and suggestions for the future. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 28, 363–92.
Rahim, A. (1983). A measure of styles of handling 
interpersonal confl ict. Academy of Management 
Journal, 26, 368–376.
Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1992). Status-quo and 
omission biases. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
5, 49–61. 
Robinson, J. P., & Shaver, P. R. (1973). Measures of 
psychological attitudes. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute 
for Social Research.
Robinson, R. J., & Keltner, D. (1996). Much ado 
about nothing: Revisionists and traditionalists 
choose an introductory English syllabus. 
Psychological Science, 7, 18–24.
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988). Status 
quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 1, 7–59. 
Schweitzer, M. (1994). Disentangling status quo 
and omission effects: An experimental analysis. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 58, 457–476.
Steinel, W., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2004). Social 
motives and strategic misrepresentation in social 
decision making. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 86, 419–434.
Ten Velden, F., Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. W. 
(2007). Majority and minority infl uence in 
group negotiation: The moderating effects of 
social motivation and decision rules. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 92, 259–268.
Thomas, K. W. (1992). Confl ict and negotiation 
processes in organizations. In M. D. Dunnette & 
L. M. Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial 
and organizational psychology (2nd ed., 
pp. 651–717). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press.
Van de Vliert, E. (1997). Complex interpersonal 
confl ict behaviour. East Sussex, UK: Psychology 
Press.
Van de Vliert, E., & Kabanoff, B. (1990). Toward 
theory-based measures of confl ict management. 
Academy of Management Journal, 33, 199–209.
Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, 
A. S. R. (2004a). The interpersonal effects of 
anger and happiness in negotiations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 57–76.
Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, 
A. S. R. (2004b). The social effects of emotions 
in negotiation: A motivated information 
processing account. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 87, 510–528.
Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., Pietroni, D., & 
Manstead, A. S. R. (2006). Power and 
emotions in negotiation: Power moderates the 
interpersonal effects of anger and happiness 
on concession making. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 36, 557–581.
Van Lange, P. A. M. (1992). Confi dence in 
expectations: A test of the triangle hypothesis. 
European Journal of Personality, 6, 371–379.
Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of 
joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An 
integrative model of social value orientations. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 
337–349.
Weingart, L. R., Bazerman, M. H., Thompson, L. L., 
& Carroll, J. S. (1990). Tactical behavior and 
negotiation outcomes. International Journal of 
Confl ict Management, 1, 7–31.
353
De Dreu et al. conflict structures and social interaction processes
Weingart, L. R., Brett, J. M., Olekalns, M., & 
Smith, P. L. (2007). Confl icting social motives 
in negotiating groups. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 93, 994–1010.
Weingart, L. R., Prietula, M. J., Hyder, E., & 
Genovese, C. (1999). Knowledge and the 
sequential processes of negotiation: 
A Markov chain analysis of response-in-kind. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 
366–393.
Paper received 28 February 2007; revised version accepted 
31 October 2007.
Biographical notes
carsten k. w. de dreu is professor of psychology 
at the Univeristy of Amsterdam. He received 
his PhD from the University of Groningen, the 
Netherlands, in 1993. He has a longstanding 
interest in the psychological processes involved 
in social confl ict, group decision making, and 
creativity and innovation.
esther s. kluwer is associate professor of social 
psychology at Utrecht University. She received 
her PhD from the University of Groningen, 
the Netherlands, in 1998. Her research concerns 
the close relationship domain, with a special 
interest in confl ict, justice, forgiveness, and the 
interface between work and family.
aukje nauta is professor of psychology at the 
University of Amsterdam and senior consultant 
at Randstad HR Solutions. She received her 
PhD from the University of Groningen, the 
Netherlands, in 1996. Her research interests 
include prosocial behavior in organizations, 
confl ict, and employability.
